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ROUNDTABLE:
SCIENCE & CIVIL JUSTICE
OPENING
EDWARD WARREN, DISCUSSION LEADER*

As moderator this morning, my role is to be a gatekeeper, which is
an important appellation for this morning's discussion because what I
would like to discuss is how science is to be effectively used in the civil
justice system. In this discussion, I would like to address both Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' and other alternative ways in
which science can be used effectively, fairly, and justly in the civil justice
system.
About a year after Daubert was decided, I wrote a short article
emphasizing the breadth and evident purpose of the case as set forth in
Justice Blackmun's decision. 2 That evident purpose was for the federal
courts, particularly at the trial level, to play gatekeeper regarding the use
of science in the courtroom. Three years of appellate decisions after
Daubert, I think on balance, demonstrate that courts are following that
lead.3
In Daubert, on remand, Judge Kozinski evaluated the plaintiffs'
experts in terms of whether or not their testimony constituted scientific
evidence under the court's definition. Judge Kozinski found their evidence
irrelevant and affirmed summary judgment for the defendant.4 Other
courts have read the decision less broadly. Particularly, Judge Barkett of
the Eleventh Circuit said the decision was intended to be a loosening of
the rules on scientific evidence in the courtroom. 5
In preparation for today, I read an obscure article written by a
practitioner from Albany, New York, who published the piece in the
Albany medical annals in 1900. This piece was then republished in the
* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis.

1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. See Edward W. Warren, Judge Leventhal's Revenge: The Courts as
"Gatekeepers" of "Good Science"After Daubert, 1994 PUB. INTEREST L. REv. 93, 94.

3. See, e.g., Borawick v. Shay, 68 F.3d 597 (2d Cir. 1995); Hose v. Chicago
Northwestern Transp. Co., 70 F.3d 968 (8th Cir. 1995); McCullock v. H.B. Fuller Co.,
61 F.3d 1038 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Powers, 59 F.3d 1460 (4th Cir. 1995);
United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 1995).
4. See Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995).
5. See Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 530 (11th Cir. 1996).
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Harvard Law Review, revealing the author's name: Billings Learned
Hand. 6 Judge Hand had an entirely different conception of what should
be done. His view was that the expert represented an exception, and an
unwarranted one, to the general rule that witnesses should not be able to
testify about the ultimate issues in the case. 7 Generally, a defendant on
trial for murder cannot be convicted by witnesses who testify that the
defendant intended to kill the victim, but experts are an exception. Expert
testimony may be used to show intent in such a case, and such a showing
could lead to a conviction. The future Judge Hand concluded this
exception was unwarranted. 8 He believed a jury was capable of calling
upon its general bank of experience to resolve scientific questions, but for
the same reasons was incapable of reconciling competing expert testimony,
even though, for hundreds of years, it was normal for juries to hear
competing scientific expert testimony.
What Judge Hand advocated instead was really conceptually different
0 through Daubert line of cases.)
from that emphasized in the Frye"
Judge Hand argued that scientific questions should be presented to a
scientific panel, which would then present its ultimate conclusions on the
general issues-those which fall outside the capability of general jurors
and society. 2 The resolutions would then be given to the jury as
authoritative determinations of general principle on matters of science.
Those determinations could be overturned by the jury only if a reasonable
jury under all the circumstances would reasonably conclude there was a
basis for rejecting them. 3 He envisioned the role of the trial judge in
that scenario as overseeing the jury's acceptance or rejection of those
general principles4 and the jury's use of those principles in resolving the
causation issues.'
So to recapitulate and to try to give some focus to this morning's
discussion, one hundred years ago, Judge Hand was saying, as a
practicing lawyer, that we have gone down the wrong road. The road we
6. See Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1902).

7. See id. at 45.
8. See id. at 45-58.
9. See id. at 51-58.
10. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992); United States

v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224
(3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).
12. See Hand, supra note 6, at 55-56.

13. See id. at 55-58.
14. See id. at 55-57.
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have gone down attempts to differentiate among those types of scientific
testimony that we will allow to be presented to the jury, and those types
that we will not. Fundamentally, that differentiation rests upon an
exception to the general prohibition against opinion testimony, which is
logically unwarranted and which has all kinds of practical consequences.
Judge Hand's counsel was rejected. We have gone down the road
with Daubert and Frye. But today, I want to pose the question of whether
Judge Hand was not right all along. Is not the better approach to think in
terms of independent scientific evaluation of key questions with that advice
being presented as general propositions? The jury would then consider
those propositions in a manner analogous to the judge's charge, although
the judge's charge would be conclusive on the jury, whereas the scientific
judgments would be only presumptive or advisory.
This obviously poses important questions: Are there independent
scientific experts out there? Are there unbiased independent scientific
experts? Or, is science simply as politicized as everything else in our
society today? Are we simply giving up one form of politicization and
embracing another? I think another question is: How do we go about
finding those experts if they exist? Is there a mechanism that could be
suggested other than a judge calling up his cronies or people from his
university or someplace else and saying, "Who do you suggest?"-a
process which has an informality that provides no guarantee of fairness,
openness, or any other consideration we would think necessary. Lastly,
is this process possible notwithstanding the fact that the trial judges
themselves are so politicized? Do we have a bench capable of turning
these issues over to an objective scientific panel, if one could be found,
and then following through in the manner suggested by Judge Hand?
We have six panelists here and, with the exception of Peter Huber and
Barry Nace, they are all non-lawyers, so they can speak to the scientific
questions here. And, coincidentally perhaps, all four know a fair amount
about the breast implant litigation. So I suspect we are going to hear, and
I would like to have addressed to the extent possible, some of the
questions I posed in the context of the breast implant litigation. However,
I ask that with two caveats. Number one, I want to make clear at the
outset that my law firm-not me but my law firm-is significantly
involved in the breast implant litigation. Secondly, I think many in this
room know that some of the issues I have suggested here are issues that
are alive today in the context of that litigation, and I do not want my
remarks to be interpreted as either an endorsement or criticism of the
general concept in the context of that particular litigation.
So I have posed several questions: Are there independent scientists?
How do we find them? Can judges be trusted to establish a process which
itself is unbiased?
Our first speaker is Barry Nace, a well-known plaintiffs' attorney. He
is a former president of the American Trial Lawyers Association of
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America and has been involved in many of the contemporary controversial
tort issues. He can, hopefully, present a general reaction to some of the
things I have addressed and give his opinion on whether or not there are
alternatives, other than the two general lines I laid out, for how scientific
issues might be resolved in the context of civil litigation.
We will then hear from Dr. George Ehrlich, who was Chairman of
the Arthritis Advisory Committee of the Food and Drug Administration
and an Adjunct Professor of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania
Medical School. He is a thoughtful critic of the scientific process in the
courts and is particularly prepared to speak to the difficulty that jurors and
judges alike have in dealing with statistics and questions where numeracy,
or the ability to deal with numbers, is at issue.
Then, we have Dr. Norman Anderson of the Johns Hopkins Medical
School. Dr. Anderson will speak of the regulatory process and the role
that regulatory agencies in that process tend to play and the interaction
between the regulatory process and the civil justice system.
We then have Dr. Stuart Schlossman, who is a Professor of Medicine
at Harvard Medical School. Professor Schlossman developed a number
of the assays used to test for immune system depression and is a critic on
how those assays, or alternatives to them, have been used in the court
system.
Then we have Gina Kolata, who is a science and medical reporter for
the New York Times, and who has written extensively about breast implant
issues. She is one of our panelists who I think is a little beyond breast
implants, although she is very knowledgeable about that, because I think
many of us on both sides, plaintiff and defense, recognize that the
Heisenberg uncertainty principle 5 certainly applies to the press. The
press are not merely observers whose actions do not affect the process;
they are very much involved. I would like Ms. Kolata to comment on the
press' special responsibility in this area.
Lastly, Peter Huber needs no introduction at all. It is well known that
Mr. Huber has written extensively in a variety of areas. I guess I would
think of Peter as more than an expert in this area, but, indeed, the leading
commentator nationwide today on technical and scientific issues as they
relate to the judicial system. He is so well-versed that he turns from one
topic to another with great aplomb. But I am sure Peter will have many
views on all the subjects I raised and the issues presented by others on the
panel.
15. For a discussion of the principle of uncertainty and its relationship to statistical
data as evidence of causation, see Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal Process, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 2183,

2193-94 (1994).
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So with no further introduction, I will turn the panel over to Mr.
Nace.

SCIENCE AND CIVIL JUSTICE:
A RECENT OXYMORON
BARRY J. NACE, FIRST PANELIST*

I guess I should say that it is nice to be here with a group that most
of my friends would refer to as "right-wing radical." When I was asked
to be on this panel, I thought, "Well, what do I want to go to that group
for?" But, then I realized it is not very often I have the chance to be on
a panel with someone who has written about me, who has said I was a
poet of the Bendectin litigation,' who wrote about my cases but never
consulted me about them, and who has quoted me only partially. So I
thought that was a good reason to join the panel. Then, I realized that this
organization also has a local judge as a member, who once said to me,
"Gee, Barry, I had to J.N.O.V. that case because you just tried a better
case than the other guy." That sounds fair.
Yet another member of this organization has criticized me, the
Bendectin litigation, and even the Supreme Court, for taking Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc. ,2even though he never had one of the
cases himself. He was a judge. There was also the opportunity to speak
to an organization that I looked at, and I think that most of my colleagues
did too, as one that is dedicated to eliminating jury trials for individuals
and to making life as difficult as possible for plaintiffs and their attorneys
to ever succeed-an organization that, I think, mostly fears juries. This
is also an opportunity to speak in front of a group that is very unusual for
me to appear before-a group that does not represent people from time to
Mr. Nace is also a member of the
Academy of Trial Lawyers,
the
International
of
America,
Trial
Lawyers
of
Association
the Civil Justice Foundation, and the American Board of Professional Liability Attorneys.
1. Bendectin was a prescription drug prescribed for the treatment of nausea during
a woman's pregnancy. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582
(1993). Bendectin suits are typically products liability actions for birth defects in
children resulting from the mother's ingestion of Bendectin during pregnancy. See, e.g.,
id. at 582; Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989); In re
Bendectin Litig., 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1988); Watson v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 769 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1985). For cases in which Barry Nace has
participated, see, e.g., Raynor v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 104 F.3d 1371
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Ealy v.
Richardson-Merrell,Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Richardsonv. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Koller v. Richardson-Merrell,Inc., 737
F.2d 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984); MerrellDowPharmaceuticals,Inc., v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d
825 (D.C. 1994); MerrellDowPharmaceuticals,Inc., v. Hauner,907 S.W.2d 535 (Tex.
App. 1994).
2. 509 U.S. 579.
* Attorney, Paulson, Nace & Norwind.
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time. This is kind of a unique experience for me, and, as I think about
it, maybe I would rather be in Philadelphia. I do not know.
I graduated from law school in Pennsylvania (Dickinson), and I also
have a degree in chemistry, which is sort of how I got into this area. But,
long before I got involved with this subject, I was trying cases in
Washington, D.C., and Bethesda, Maryland, as a personal injury attorney.
When you read about me, you would think I am part of a huge law firm
and that I have been doing these huge things for all these years. Actually,
my law firm has five people in it-probably smaller than most of yours.
I was told that the topic today was supposed to be "science and civil
justice." First of all, in the last few years, I have seen little civil justice
where science is involved. I have seen people get up, put things in briefs,
and argue and write things about such subjects as epidemiology,
confidence intervals, "proof," and "no evidence," and do it absolutely
wrong and know that they are doing it wrong. I have seen the phrase-a
very tricky phrase-"junk science," which was coined somewhere along
the line. The phrase has turned into what others have called "junk
scholarship." I have known of scientists who have been working with the
drug companies and who write articles because they are asked to-and this
is something for the scientists here to think about-articles that are
approved by drug companies even before they are printed.
I have also read opinions written by judges, such as the second
Daubert decision referred to earlier.3 I was involved in that case and I
have no idea where the facts in that opinion came from.
So I often
wonder what is going on. I have to admit that in my stronger moments,
I really wonder how some people can sleep out there, and in my weaker
moments, I wish it would happen to them. But it does not. Regarding
science and civil justice, I think we are in a situation right now where
anything goes. Anything goes as far as the "end" of winning is met.
Was Judge Hand wrong? If you think that juries and people are
stupid, he was not wrong. If you believe juries are not smart enough to
handle these issues, then they should not be presented to the juries. But,
I do not agree with that premise and for those of us who actually go into
courtrooms and try cases, and actually get down there in the pits and deal
with people, Judge Hand was wrong. He was wrong just as those judges
are wrong who want to decide that a case cannot get to a jury because the
judge wants to decide whether or not the conclusion is right. This violates
the holding in Daubert-whichnobody ever contested by the way-that the
judge should be allowed to decide only whether or not there is proper
methodology. 4
3. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
4. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.
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I recently argued a case in a court of appeals that, if you follow Judge
Hand's reasoning, should be affirmed on the basis that juries are too
stupid to understand the issue.' I disagree. The case has been around for
twelve years now, twelve years in front of the same judge. There were
two summary judgments granted. Obviously, the first one was ultimately
unsuccessful, or there would not have been a second. However, after the
first motion, the plaintiff had to expand her affidavits, which were very
thick and were accompanied by numerous articles. There were two
experts-one had one hundred fourteen articles and one had seventy-seven
articles. The defendants filed no response.
The plaintiffs were then asked to bring in its experts for a Daubert
hearing. 6 Before that happened, however, the judge postponed the
hearing three times-twice on the day it was scheduled, with the experts
already in town. The judge decided there ought to be something prepared
by the plaintiffs in a "question and answer format." So that was done.
The expert witnesses then came back into town and were crossexamined for a day. The defendants offered no affidavits or literature to
the contrary. In fact, the defendants' attorneys did no more than stand
up and blatantly say, "plaintiffs' experts, who are qualified, are wrong."
The judge granted summary judgment again. Imagine the expense to the
plaintiffs caused by this judge. And we wonder why our citizens so
distrust our system of justice.
Judge Barkett, in Joiner v. General Electric Co.,' also referred to
earlier, obviously would have said that was improper, and I would suggest
to you that Judge Hand probably would have thought that was a good idea.
I was unfamiliar with the story of Judge Hand before today, but I suspect
he would have liked that.
Unfortunately, what we lose sight of is that juries can make good
decisions and that, as Justice Blackmun said, there is a need for crossexamination.' The traditional way of attacking weak evidence is through
cross-examination. Attorneys are trained to do that, and certainly those
who represent the drug companies and the manufacturers are usually pretty
capable attorneys. I have never found a General Motors, Ford, or drug
company that could not afford a good attorney, or two, three, four, or ten
or twelve in one case for that matter.
I suspect there may be one or two people on my side in this room
today, but for those of you who are out there advocating, we need to do
more, such as Judge Hand may have suggested. You probably have not
5. See Ambrosini, 101 F.3d at 129.

6. Ahearing in which the trial judge determines whether an expert's testimony rests
upon a reliable methodology. See id.
7. 78 F.3d 524 (11th Cir. 1996).
8. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.
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tried too many cases and, thus, have not seen the wisdom that exists in
juries and in the jury system. I would suggest that before you go too far
in supporting something like that, say to yourself: "What if it were me?"
"What if it were my child?" "Would I want that done?" "Would I want
scientists to have a blue ribbon discussion about this?" If you could find
three scientists to have a panel who were not somehow connected with the
situation, I would be surprised.
A judge in Michigan recently decided that she wanted to appoint some
scientists, so she gave us a list of five scientists. She never did say why.
We were supposed to choose three, but there was not one scientist on the
list who was not somehow connected to the company. The judge thought
that should not matter since I would have a chance to cross-examine the
witness. But, stop and think what you would want. What kind of justice
would you want if it were your child or spouse or father or mother?
Would you want Judge Hand's philosophy or would you want to rely upon
attorneys to do the job they are trained to do in the courtroom and in front
of the citizens of this country?

THE PERPETUATION OF ERROR
GEORGE EHRLICH,

M.D., SECOND PANELIST*

I will not give you a chronology of the silicone breast implant issue
at this point, but I will address some of the things that were just said.
Yes, as a parent or as a potential litigant, I would want science to prevail
because, unlike what was said, that there is one side or another, science
does not take sides. True science has no sides; the only side is true
science-good science. False science, pseudo-science, and non-science
have no place in the argument. Sheila Birnbaum spoke earlier of
computers, copiers, faxes, and the Internet.' In her early days, there
was only carbon paper, and none of these other things were available. In
my early days, when I was in medical school, we still used a textbook by
William Boyd,2 a Canadian pathologist, in which he stated that there are
not always answers, but that sometimes we would simply have to ascribe
outcomes to a visitation from God. However, that concept no longer
works because you cannot sue God.
Somebody must be responsible when something goes wrong or when
something happens after another event, which is often faulty reasoning.
Recently, on Today, they talked about the encephalitis mosquitoes in
Rhode Island, 3 about the strongest hurricanes since the 1940s, about
floods, AIDS, and the Ebola virus-a great many natural events and
diseases. The reports bring to mind Pope Innocent VIII's papal Bull,
issued in 1484, entitled, Summis desiderantes affectibus, in which he
legitimized the work of the plaintiffs' attorneys of the time, Kraemer and
Sprenger, who had proclaimed that witchcraft was rife and was the cause
of all the bad weather and the plagues-such as the Black Plague,
smallpox, and "large" pox, which we today know as syphilis-that were
decimating Europe, 4 and the many instances of groups of people behaving
* Adjunct Professor of Medicine at the University of Pennsylvania School of
Medicine and Adjunct Professor of Clinical Medicine at the New York University School
of Medicine. Dr. Ehrlich is also a member of the Expert Advisory Panel on Chronic
Degenerative Diseases of the World Health Organization (WHO) and Chairman of the
Arthritis Advisory Committee of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.
1. See Sheila Birbaum, Class Certification-The Exception, Not the Rule, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 347 (1997).
2. See WILLIAM BOYD, A TEXTBOOK OF PATHOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MEDICINE (7th ed. 1961).
3. See Today: Killer Mosquitoes (NBC television broadcast, Sept. 12, 1996).
4. For a brief history of physician Johann Weyer and his work to uncover the mass
psychosis of his time, see George E. Ehrlich, DoctorsAfield. Johann Weyer and the
Witches, 263 NEw ENG. J. MED. 245-46 (1960).
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strangely or reporting untoward symptoms. Following the issue of the
Bull, many went on what was, basically, a legitimized witch hunt. There
was a Marcia Angell' in those days too, named Johann Weyer, who said
that certainly there was disease and natural events, but a lot of what was
going on was hysteria, which he uncovered.' Weyer, too, wrote a book
about it, although it was immediately put on the proscribed list by the
Church.
Kraemer and Sprenger worked, and their successors worked, so that
during the next hundred years more than a million people in Germany
accused of practicing witchcraft were executed under horrible
circumstances as prescribed in their book. This witch hunt went on
despite scientific evidence to the contrary, because everything that
happened was blamed on something and someone. The voices of reason
included, incidentally, Dr. Johannes Faust-to be later memorialized in
plays and operas-and Hans Sachs7 of Meistersinger fame, and a few
brave others. But that is another story.
The fact is that we have been through all this before, and science has
been misused before. The symptoms and signs attributed to silicone
implants are almost exactly those that in the 19th Century were ascribed
to railways by a British physician, Dr. Ericksen.8 He called it "railway
spine," the symptoms of which included cognitive impairment, poor
concentration, sleep disturbance, anxiety, irritability, back stiffness and
pain, joint pains, pain on movement, headaches and loss of sexual desire.
The plaintiffs' lawyers of the day sued the railroads on that basis and won.
Of course, that diagnosis and attribution disappeared and was replaced
by neurasthenia at the turn of the century. Today, we have the silicone
breast implant syndrome that, because none of the diseases that were
previously alleged turned out to occur in any excess, is said to cause
"atypical" disease. Atypical disease, of course, is undefinable, and the
so-called "experts" who testify to it use circular reasoning to justify their
beliefs. Therefore, the problem arises, whom can you believe. In the
courtroom, the plaintiffs' attorneys are extremely persuasive, and they
5. Executive Editor of the New England Journalof Medicine and proponent of the
view that there is no scientific evidence linking silicone to any disease. She also believes
that the process for presenting scientific evidence in the courtroom should be restructured
to eliminate lay jurors from evaluating evidence unless it has been proven to scientific
certainty. For more discussion on this view, see MARCIA ANGELL, M.D., SCIENCE ON
TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT
CASE (1996).
6. See Ehrlich, M.D., supra note 4, at 245.
7. See generally GREGORY ZILBOORG, M.D., THE MEDICAL MAN AND THE WITCH

DURING THE RENAISSANCE (1969) (briefly describing the efforts of Hans Sachs).
8. See ROBERT FERRARI, WHIPLASH (forthcoming 1997).
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often sound much more credible than defense attorneys. Furthermore,
their "experts"-and there are few since not many physicians are willing
to testify to this so-called syndrome-have paper credentials that compare
favorably to those of the defense experts.
So how does one make a decision? Remember that science cannot
prove a negative; science can only prove positives. It can confirm an
association but cannot conclusively deny one. That is why we use
confidence limits and other statistical terms that tell us the chances of an
association are small. If every study comes out the same way, pointing
in the same direction, then the chances are even smaller that there is a
relationship, even if some of the studies lack power because the control
group is too small to be definitive.
When talking about an event that receives media attention or a
program like Connie Chung's television show, which gave an unopposed
view that silicone breast implants cause disease, 9 people are frightened
and tend to remember these things. If I ask anyone in this room what you
had for dinner last Thursday, most of you will not remember what you
had; but, if it was your anniversary, or some other notable event, and you
had a special dinner, you would definitely remember. That is why
epidemiology usually finds a slightly increased risk for certain things when
they check these out, because people do remember when they are so
primed and have a reason to remember. They have more reason to
remember. However, we do not even find that slight increase in most of
the studies here.
So the problem comes down to innumeracy. Many of the physicians
who truly believe what they say are innumerate, innumerate being the
mathematical equivalent of illiterate. These physicians do not understand
that the people they see are funnelled to them, often by attorneys, who
represent a specific "numerator" population, and the physicians do not
know what the denominator is-they do not know how often something
like this occurs in the general population. The physicians only see the
people who come to their offices.
Berkson, the originator of
epidemiologic studies at the Mayo Clinic, long ago defined this problem
to the Mayo physicians. He said that some of the diseases, supposedly
rare, appear to be very common, but only because they were seen at the
Mayo Clinic, to which they were funneled because of the expertise to be
found there. They would not be common in the community-at-large. That
is precisely the phenomenon we are dealing with here.
So far, no evidence has emerged to suggest that the silicone used in
medical devices is immunogenic, that is, that it can cause immune
reactions. In fact, no evidence has emerged to show that it can cause any
9. See Face to Face with Connie Chung-Breast Implants: DangerousDevices?

(CBS television broadcast, Dec. 10, 1990).
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of the diseases alleged, especially since most of these diseases are no
longer said to result from silicone. So we have this vague group of
symptoms and signs that no one can verify.

LAWSUIT SCIENCE: LESSONS FROM
THE SILICONE BREAST IMPLANT CONTROVERSY
NORMAN ANDERSON, M.D., THIRD PANELIST*

I am here as an historian who tore up prepared remarks when I heard
history being revised by the Wall Street Journal and an attorney for Dow
Corning in the first panel discussion.' To amend those views, I will add
my understanding of the evolution of silicone breast implant regulation and
litigation. I hope you do not dismiss these comments as pure fancy, for
I was a bit player in that drama.
In my mind, the silicone story began in the 1960s when an estimated
fifty thousand American women received illicit silicone liquid injections
to augment their breasts. The results were disastrous. The women
developed inflammatory granulomas. The silicone extruded through holes
in the breast and caused massive necrosis and scarring. These women
now had breasts that felt like rocks and they often faced breast
amputation. By the end of the 1970s, there was hardly a plastic surgeon
in the United States who was not caring for some of these women.
In the midst of this debacle, the federal court indicted Dow Coming
for misbranding, mislabelling, and transporting liquid silicone across state
2
A huge legal battle
lines for the illicit injection into these women.
to eight counts and
contendere
nolo
followed. In 1971, Dow Coming pled
3
fines.
in
dollars
thousand
of
five
total
a
paid
The focus then shifted to gel implants where the same liquid silicone
was used to swell a gel matrix contained within a silicone elastomer
These prostheses were introduced in 1963 and gained
envelope.
widespread clinical acceptance without extensive safety testing because
none was required for any device before Congress passed the Medical
Device Amendment in 1976. After that date, silicone breast implants
continued in use under provisions of a grandfather clause which permitted
the sale of all devices established in the marketplace before regulatory
oversight was mandated-with the added caveat that the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) would require scientific proof of the safety and
efficacy for each device at some future date.
* Associate Professor of Medicine at the Johns Hopkins University School of
Medicine.
1. See Sheila Birnbaum, Class Certification-The Exception, Not the Rule, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 347 (1997); Max Boot, Introduction, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 337
(1997).
2. See United States v. Dow Coming Corp., No. 5381 (E.D. Mich. filed Aug. 6,
1967).
3. See id. (E.D. Mich. filed July 15, 1971).
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Breast implants first came under scientific scrutiny of the FDA in
1978 when an advisory panel composed largely of surgeons concluded that
the implants were safe and recommended these devices be moved into
Class II where sound manufacturing practices would suffice to protect the
consumer. 4 However, the FDA did not accept that advice and ordered a
second review of breast implant safety.
I chaired the FDA advisory panel when this reappraisal was
undertaken in 1982-1983.
We knew that liquid silicone injections
destroyed human breast tissue, so the durability of the envelope
surrounding the gel became a primary issue. As liquid silicone injections
were also illegal, we were surprised to learn-and I think chagrined to
learn-that neither the manufacturers or plastic surgeons submitted any
convincing data on the incidence of device failure, implant rupture or gel
bleed. There were a host of other problems, but the long-term fate of gel
implants was certainly not answered. Accordingly, that advisory panel
voted unanimously to keep these devices in Class III-safety and efficacy
not proven. The same panel also urged the manufacturers and plastic
surgeons to work closely with the FDA in resolving these questions.5 All
parties agreed to this course of action in the public hearing, but that
accord disintegrated when the closing gavel hit the table.
In the early 1980s, we began hearing of product liability cases where
implant ruptures resulted in fluid gel migration anywhere between the
clavicle and groin. Since that extravasated silicone could not be
effectively removed from body tissues, these women won substantial
damage awards in jury trials and out-of-court settlements. Because all of
these cases were placed under court protective orders, only manufacturers,
attorneys, and their clients knew the precise outcomes of implant
ruptures.6 But this veil of secrecy began lifting as that decade progressed
and FDA concerns over safety heightened when numerous anecdotal
stories and case reports began describing clinical problems with breast
implants.
In 1988, I again chaired an FDA advisory panel whose purpose was
to inform all manufacturers that they would soon be required to provide
4. See MARCIA ANGELL, M.D., SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 51 (1996).

5. See HUMAN RESOURCES & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMM.,
COMMITTEE ON Gov'T OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESs., THE FDA's REGULATION
OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 4 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter Committee Print].
The devices were ultimately given Class III status. See 21 C.F.R. § 878.3540(b) (1996).
6. See ANGELL, supra note 4, at 52; cf. Greg Rushford, Senator Takes Aim at
Secret Court Settlements, LEGAL TIMES, May 2, 1994, at 1 (quoting Al Cortese, "the
defense bar's chief strategist" on secrecy issues, as stating that "[t]he FDA had all the
technical information it needed all along ... ).
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scientific proof of the safety of the breast implants which they had been
marketing for twenty-five years. That goal was achieved, but it was
almost obscured by the public furor created by Dow Corning's long-term
toxicity study which showed silicone gel produced sarcomas in rats. 7
However, I was more shaken by two other events at that meeting.
The first issue surfaced when women testified they had reported their
breast implant-related injuries to manufacturers. Yet, when they returned
to seek further action, there was no record of their complaints in the
companies' files. Such failure to recognize, record, and report productrelated injuries to the FDA probably occurred because existing regulations
gave manufacturers the discretionary authority to decide whether any
injury was serious and device-related.8 Certainly, the testimony of these
women indicated that the FDA's prime system for monitoring implant
related injuries was both flawed and unreliable.
The second problem highlighted at that meeting came when a
California attorney, Mr. Dan Bolton,9 testified there were serious
problems associated with silicone breast implants which could not be
discussed because he was under a court protective order.'0 This
allegation caused real concerns because the panel knew that Mr. Bolton
was a plaintiff's attorney in Maria Stern v. Dow Coming Corp." where
the jury had given the plaintiff a multimillion dollar award comprised
largely of punitive damages against the manufacturer which far exceeded
the compensatory damages given for personal injury. 2 Faced with the
public intimations that data relevant to implant safety had been withheld
from FDA scrutiny by court secrecy orders, the panel urged the agency
to use its legal powers to unseal and review all breast implant liability
7. See Committee Print, supra note 5, at 9; ANGELL, supra note 4, at 57-58.
8. See Judy Foreman, Women and Silicone:A History ofRisk, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan.
19, 1992, at 1.
9. Daniel C. Bolton was the trial lawyer in Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 1994), and Maria Stern v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 83-2348 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
10. See Don J. DeBenedictis, FDA Action Spurs Implant Suits: Evidence Unearthed
in Earlier Cases Led to Call for a Moratorium, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1992, at 20; Gina
Kolata, Secrecy Ordersin Lawsuits Prompt States' Efforts to Restrict Their Use, N.Y.
TImEs, Feb. 18, 1992, at D10.
11. No. 83-2348; see also Kolata, supra note 10 (noting that Maria Stem "brought
the first product liability suit against the Dow Coming Corporation ... contend[ing] that
the implants leaked silicone throughout her body and caused a life-threatening

autoimmune reaction").
12. See ANGELL, supra note 4, at 52 (noting "a jury award of nearly $2million");
see also Kolata, supra note 10, at D10 (noting that Dow later settled this case for an
amount which reportedly "ran to seven figures").
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cases under protective order. Regrettably, such actions were never taken
and the knowledge gap between regulation and litigation persisted.
In 1991, the FDA called for all manufacturers to present scientific
proof of the safety and efficacy of silicone breast implants. However,
preliminary reviews of these submissions made it quite clear that none
would pass muster. Recognizing these deficiencies, breast implant
proponents attempted to override the regulatory process using political
pressures, congressional lobbying and public relations campaigns. In the
midst of this clamor, a new advisory panel was convened. At its first
meeting under the glare of television lights, several manufacturers'
representatives stood before piles of boxes which they claimed contained
new data on implant safety but could not present because procedural rules
required manufacturers to submit all data prior to the panel meeting to
permit review by FDA staff. After this tardy submission was denied, I
requested that one of the FDA administrators obtain this material for
review and was then informed that the boxes were empty for this was
simply a public relations ploy. Since I have not seen any semblance of
such new information put forward by the manufacturers in ensuing years,
it does appear that the action was truly a charade for television.
However, subsequent events were influenced more by revelations from
the legal scene. These surfaced in Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 13
where the plaintiff alleged that systemic illness was produced by silicone
breast implants and won another multimillion dollar award which included
both compensatory and punitive damages. Sealed court documents from
this case were given to the FDA by a reporter from the San Francisco
Examiner.'
This material included information which the FDA had
never seen detailing scientific fraud, shoddy production practices and the
rush to market implants which bled gel freely with some rupturing within
months to release a fluid gel analogous to liquid silicone. Similar
revelations immediately appeared in the lay press describing gel bleed
from implants which left grease spots upon velvet display cloths and cited
corporate documents urging salesmen to scrub implant surfaces free of gel
bleed before marketing these devices to plastic surgeons, etc.' 5 I will not
cite other allegations posed by these documents, but the sum of this
information was very disturbing.
Under the glare of this publicity, the FDA imposed a moratorium on
breast implant usage. A bitter public debate followed where breast
implant proponents co-opted the feminist term "choice" and accused the
FDA of adopting a paternalistic stance which denied women's rights.
Others, who had been unable to prove implant safety despite thirty years
13. 33 F.3d 1116.

14. See Committee Print, supra note 5, at 45-46; ANGELL, supra note 4, at 55-56.
15. See Committee Print, supra note 5, at 33-35; ANGELL, supra note 4, at 57-59.
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of opportunity, immediately condemned all research critical of breast
implants as "junk science."
The FDA ultimately weathered this storm and limited silicone breast
implants to restricted use in 1992. At the same time, plaintiffs' attorneys
began their standard approach using case precedent to identify clients with
illnesses similar to those cited in Stem and Hopkins. This effort
culminated in mass tort actions which built a settlement upon prorated
injury and gave the highest payments to replicas of those two cases.16
Ultimately, this class action settlement floundered leaving a morass of
product liability and bankruptcy suits which are still being argued in the
courts today.
However, the discovery process initiated by the multi-District
Litigation Group of the American Bar Association did add new insights to
this controversy. An in-house advisory panel of the FDA reviewed some
of this information and concluded as follows:
The studies Dow Corning omitted from the [pre-market
approval] for their silicone gel-filled breast prostheses . . . do
contain information significant to determination of the safety and
effectiveness of breast implants.
... The FDRL studies, in particular, show toxicologic
effects of silicone polymers that the manufacturers, including
Dow Corning, had been saying cannot be produced in the animal
model.
... [T]he more salient question should be "was the
withholding of these studies an attempt to deceive." The content
of the withheld documents can be said to show a pattern.
Intelligent people familiar with this material and anxious to obtain
agency approval would recognize that these studies would draw
more inquiry and justify further investigation into the safety of
these devices. It is reasonable to assume that such people would
not want this to happen and, being in the position to control the
content of the [pre-market approval application], would leave
these studies out to improve the changes for [pre-market]
approval. This would be almost impossible to prove without
further internal documents from Dow clearly recording a
16. See Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, ora Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMEs, June 13,
1995, at DI (noting that "[w]omen were recruited as plaintiffs by lawyers who traveled
the country with medical experts").
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conspiracy. If17such documents ever did exist, they certainly do
not exist now.
As these events unfolded within the FDA, the Dow Corning
Corporation abandoned the manufacture of breast implants, changed its
leadership, and began coping with the challenges of mass litigation. When
they announced their plans to resolve this controversy by funding new
scientific research on breast implant safety,' I met with Mr. Keith
McKenna, the newly appointed CEO of Dow Corning, his medical officer
and his epidemiologist. That meeting can best be described as a screening
interview designed primarily to learn what types of illnesses I was seeing
in implant recipients. But Mr. McKenna made it clear that Dow Corning
was willing to commit twenty to thirty million dollars to resolve questions
about implants. In reply, I asked, requested, and literally begged that
such monies be administered by a panel outside of Dow Corning, so that
impartial scientists could decide which issues should be examined. That
wish was not honored, and a small circle within Dow Corning went on to
fund research directed at corporate needs.
What has emerged is a sophisticated form of lawsuit science where
highly selected research by respected investigators has addressed only the
issues chosen by Dow Corning. With thirty million dollars spent in this
manner and nothing directed towards plaintiffs' concerns or an impartial
look at other implant associated problems, the results were inevitable.
Epidemiologic studies selected by these mechanisms and published in the
New England Journalof Medicine failed to support a statistical correlation
between breast implants and autoimmune diseases.
Those cautious
conclusions were inflated by spin doctors to proclaim breast implants as
manifestly safe and free from clinical problems.
Certainly that
information has influenced court decisions and a recent Daubert panel in
Oregon.
Today, this panel is discussing tort reform and some members are
criticizing scientific experts brought into the courts by plaintiffs. I will
not defend abuses of that system, but I want to raise this question: With
thirty million dollars being spent on selected research, should we not ask
what has been omitted from review-and why? Clearly, the incidence of
device failure, the consequences of implant rupture, and causes for the soft
17. Memorandum from task leader of the Breast Prosthesis PMA Review Team of
the FDA to Ronald Johnson, Director of the OCS, June 1992, quoted in Deposition of

Robert R. LeVier, PhD, In re Silicone Breast Implants, MDL-926 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
18. See Marcia Angell, M.D., Shattuck Lecture-Evaluating the Health Risks of

Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1515 (1996) (noting that breast implant manufacturers began
funding studies of the safety of breast implants).
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tissue pain syndromes associated with breast implants have been ignored.
Indeed, I submit that if studies from the Mayo and Harvard Women's
Group had looked at liquid silicone injections into the breast, they would
have concluded no illnesses arose from the injections because of
limitations in the study design.
My final point is how can any Daubert panel-which does not do its
own research, but is dependent upon selected research sponsored by the
manufacturer-arrive at a fair and sound scientific opinion. I believe the
FDA provides scientific review equal to any Daubert panel, but its
regulatory intent was defeated by the selective suppression and editing of
scientific data in the breast implant controversy. Corporate sponsored
research can be good business, but its abuses jeopardize both effective
regulation and tort reform. If we are going to push for reforms, these
must occur on both sides of the bar. The American judicial system should
settle for nothing less.

SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON THE MISUSE OF SCIENTIFIC
EVIDENCE IN THE COURTROOM
STUART F. SCHLOSSMAN, M.D., FOURTH PANELIST*
I may be one of those scientists who spends ninety-eight percent of his
time doing science and a small percentage of his time dealing with the use
and misuse of scientific evidence in the courts. The difficulty is that the
courts are being asked to deal with medical and scientific problems which
they are largely ill-equipped to handle. Perhaps I can give you a bit of
my own experience on this matter.
Over the years, I have developed a number of the tests that are used
to assess immunologic function in man. The CD4 test, for example, that
deals with AIDS and HIV, was developed in my laboratory many years
ago, as were many of the others that have been used by plaintiffs'
attorneys and experts to evaluate the immune response. I have also been
asked to review data on, for example, toxic spills as well as some of the
data on silicone breast implants. In a recent toxic spill case, CD26, an
antigen that was discovered in my laboratory, was purported to be
abnormal in a very large population of individuals that were exposed to
this toxic-supposedly toxic-spill. There were no objective clinical
symptoms in this population, nor could any immunologist or internist find
objective evidence in these patients that their immunologic system was
compromised as evidenced by an increased frequency of infections,
autoimmunity, susceptibility to a variety of uncommon infections, or
higher incidence of cancer. We could not define a particular clinical
condition and much of the case rested on the use and misuse of a variety
of clinical assays, the validity of which a jury was going to be asked to
judge.
The scientific literacy of juries is very low. I think if you asked most
juries whether astrology is a scientific area, they would say, "yes." So
to ask them to evaluate the health of people who have eighteen percent
CD26 positive cells would be very difficult in my mind. Although I
discovered the test, I do not know of any diagnostic or predictive value of
the test in any disease. Even if I were to argue with individuals who say
that it has diagnostic value or predictive value, it would really be my word
against theirs. I am not sure a jury can always distinguish the credibility
of someone who discovered the test and is a member of the National
Baruj Benacerraf Professor of Medicine, Harvard Medical School. Dr.
Schlossman also currently serves on the Editorial Board of Clinical and Experimental
Immunology and is a member of the Association of American Physicians, the American
Society for Clinical Investigation, the American Association of Immunologists, and the
National Academy of Sciences.
*
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Academy of Scientists from an expert who happens to be practicing
clinical ecology in Northern California.
The point is that I was struck by the fact that I did not understand why
the CD26 levels in the plaintiffs were high, but accepted, as a scientist,
that the data was correct. The defendants' attorneys did not want to
repeat the tests. The plaintiffs' attorneys only did the test once, in a
laboratory known to give them results they wished. Thus, I asked to see
the primary data, and the two huge cartons arrived that were not ballast
but were filled with data-and, as it turned out, the CD26 elevations were
fabricated.
So the difficult issue is how to assess a variety of tests that are
misused by purportedly reputable scientists. Mr. Nace indicated that if it
were your child, it would be a terrible thing. I would say that many of
the children in that community, who were told they had chemically
induced AIDS, are living with a terrible burden and fear that they may
develop this terrible disease when, in fact, there was no scientific data to
support their claim.
Regarding the breast implant litigation, I think it is true that perhaps
the companies did not do enough in the beginning, but the epidemiologic
data indicate right now that there is no evidence of a disease. The
plaintiffs' lawyers and experts started by saying that maybe there was a
higher frequency of cancer. They looked, but there was no increase in
cancer.' Then they said there was a higher frequency of scleroderma.
They looked, but there was no increased incidence of scleroderma.2 Then
they said there was an increased incidence of lupus, but there was no
increased incidence of lupus.3 There is no increased incidence of any
connective tissue disease. 4 Subsequently, they said the real problem was
that we have missed an atypical symptom complex, and this is what
occurred with CD26. It was not that I did not understand CD26, but I did
not know the pattern of CD26, plus CD4, plus CD56 was atypical and this
1. See Jack C. Fisher, M.D., The Silicone Controversy-When Will Science
Prevail?, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1696, 1697 (1992).
2. See Marcia Angell, M.D., Shattuck Lecture-Evaluating the Health Risks of
Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334

NEW ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1515 (1996); Jorge Sanchez-Guerrero, M.D., et al., Silicone
Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-TissueDiseases and Symptoms, 332 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1666, 1666-70 (1995).
3. See Angell, supra note 2, at 1515; Sanchez-Guerrero, supra note 2, at 1670.

4. See Angell, supra note 2, at 1515; Sanchez-Guerrero, supranote 2, at 1666; see
also Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total Travesty?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995,

at D1 (reporting that many independent immunologists and Britain's Medical Devices
Agency have pointed to epidemiological studies which have consistently failed to find
links between implants and connective tissue diseases).
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was a pattern that only the experts for the plaintiffs could see, but which
most scientists could not.
To date, we have a fair amount of epidemiologic data that states there
is no evidence of disease in patients with breast implants. These studies
have not been carried out by people who are supported by the drug
companies. These scientists have done magnificent epidemiologic studies
and have found no increased incidence of disease. It is totally unfair to
have what they said denigrated by announcing they or their institutions
may have received support from drug companies.
A second point to consider is that some of the tests used by the
plaintiffs' experts, such as the T-cell response to silicone and antibodies
to silicone tests, are tests carried out in these individuals' laboratories and
have not been replicated or verified by the scientific community. Also,
we have suggested that if a test has been peer-reviewed, then it has a
certain level of validity. The difficulty is that we did not anticipate that
questionable scientists would start their own journals. And those of us
who study science really love to get a paper into Cell, Nature, or Science.
We even like to get papers into the New England Journal of Medicine.
But, in contrast to these journals, there are journals that, I can assure you,
nobody has even heard of except the small group of individuals that make
up the editorial board, and who make sure their friends are on these
boards. Therefore, the concept of peer review, and the belief that a jury
can deal with these complex issues, is really very difficult for me to
accept. Thus, I really must go back to the principle of having expert
panels to help judges and lawyers.
I have a son who is a lawyer. He is the one who did not like
chemistry and science and blood as a child. I also have a son, who is a
physician, who did like mathematics and the other sciences. I believe that
even lawyers who got degrees in chemistry, perhaps twenty years ago,
were technologically obsolescent a week after they got their degree, just
as most of us in the scientific community would be if we failed to keep
up.
We are asking juries who are scientifically illiterate to deal with very
complex issues. We are asking judges and lawyers who I also think, to
a large extent, are scientifically incapable of dealing with very complicated
issues. On the other hand, we have many scientific groups in our society
such as the National Academy of Medicine, the Institute of Medicine, the
American Association of Immunologists, for example, which I think could
provide expertise or a panel of unbiased individuals who could help assess
the validity of some of the scientific claims that are presently being made.

SCIENCE AND CIVIL JUSTICE
GINA KOLATA, FIFrH PANELIST*

I had the same funny feeling that Mr. Nace had about being in front
of a radical right-wing group, because as soon as I got involved in the
breast implant controversy and some other stories, I suddenly became the
darling of conservative groups. That is a very funny position for me. I
never thought of myself as being aligned with one side or another, and it
indicated to me how polarized people's opinions get and how much people
want you to say what they think fits into their political view of things.
I went at the story as a science reporter, and I am one of those people
who does like science. I have a master's degree in mathematics, and I
studied molecular biology in graduate school as well. So I like all this
stuff, and I consider myself "quantitatively literate," which is the new
catch word for people who like to look at this kind of thing. Yet it was
not an easy thing for me to report on.
At first, I was not reporting on this topic at the New York Times.
Somebody else was handling these stories, and we stake out our own
claim for things. It was not that somebody told me not to do it; rather,
it was that I never said I particularly wanted to do it.
I first became aware of some of the problems with breast implants
when I did a story on secrecy in the courts and on court orders that seal
information one might want to know. I spoke to Dan Bolton, who told
me about a judgment that I believe was in the Maria Stern case.2 He also
told me about this incredibly damning evidence that Dow Corning knew,
and knows, concerning how dangerous breast implants are and about how
they willfully hid their material from the Food and Drug Administration
* Science and medicine reporter for The New York Times.
1. See Gina Kolata, Secrecy Orders in Lawsuits Prompt States' Efforts to Restrict

Their Use, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1992, at D10.
2. Daniel C. Bolton was the trial lawyer in Hopkins v. Dow Corning Corp., 33 F.3d
1116 (9th Cir. 1994), and Maria Stern v. Dow Corning Corp., No. 83-2348 (N.D. Cal.
1984).
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(FDA).' He also told me that he could not disclose what he knew
because of the secrecy order.
That stuck with me. However, I thought that the evidence I had to
that point was anecdotal, and as a quantitatively literate science reporter,
I was really skeptical of anecdotal evidence. I saw it in the Bendectin
case 4 and I was skeptical then. I was skeptical when I saw people coming
forward saying that they had scleroderma and breast implants, and,
therefore, the breast implants caused the scleroderma. That is like saying,
I drank coffee this morning and I have scleroderma; therefore, the coffee
caused the scleroderma. You really cannot simply draw that kind of a
conclusion, and I think most of us who have been in this business learn
not to jump to those conclusions. I was not persuaded by the anecdotes,
but I still had my doubts because of the stories that there were secret data
that were not provided to the FDA-secret data that were in the hands of
Dow Corning, and which the FDA did not have.
Then the scientific evidence started coming out and nothing seemed
to be supported.' The epidemiology did not seem to be supporting what
the plaintiffs' attorneys said. I still kept thinking there might be another
piece to the picture. Some data that we did not have-secret data that the
FDA saw-prompted the FDA to ask the Justice Department to get
involved.' It was years later before I found out what came of this. Dow
Corning told me, but I checked with the FDA just to be sure.
It turned out, I believe it was during the multi-district litigation, that
Dow Corning's lawyers were going through a storeroom with all types of
3. See HUMAN RESOURCES & INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS SUBCOMM.,
COMMITTEE ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., THE FDA's REGULATION
OF SILICONE BREAST IMPLANTS 29-30 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter Committee
Print]; Phillip J. Hilts, Panel to Consider What Sort of Rules Should Control Gel
Implants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at D10 (stating that an expert "panel was
convened by the Food and Drug Administration after the recent disclosure that
manufacturers of silicone implants disregarded evidence of possible safety problems for
years").
4. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
5. See Marcia Angell, M.D., Shattuck Lecture-Evaluating the Health Risks of

Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Science, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1515 (1996); Jorge Sanchez-Guerrero, M.D., et al., Silicone
Breast Implants and the Risk of Connective-TissueDiseases and Symptoms, 332 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1666, 1666 (1995); see also Gina Kolata, A Case of Justice, or a Total
Travesty?, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at D1 (reporting that many independent

immunologists and Britain's Medical Devices Agency have pointed to epidemiological
studies which have consistently failed to find links between implants and connective tissue
diseases).

6. See Kolata, supra note 5, at D1 (noting that "the F.D.A. and the Justice
Department cleared the company of allegations of withholding data").
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documents and came upon something from the FDA and the Justice
Department. It said that they had looked at all the information that Dow
Corning had not given them and decided that there was nothing new that
was not also in the information that Dow Coming did give them. In fact,
it could reasonably be argued the information Dow Coming did not give
them was of a lesser quality but generally supportive of the information
they did give the FDA and Justice Department. 7 So it made sense for
Dow Corning not to have necessarily provided the FDA with this other
information. It is not that anything was hidden; it was simply that there
was nothing new there. It was just information that was not of as high a
scientific quality.
I thought that was amazing. Neither the FDA nor the Justice
Department ever told Dow Coming; they never mentioned it to anybody;
it just went away. I called the FDA, told them I had the document, and
asked if it was genuine. I thought perhaps it was an interim report that
was later refuted or proven wrong. The FDA told me it was their final
report. The Justice Department contacted Dow Corning and said that it
was dropping its case, and they never commented on anything else. So
as far as we know, there was nothing else. But, as a reporter, this placed
a doubt in my mind. The epidemiology never showed anything, but there
was always the question of whether the studies were to be trusted.
One suspicious study was conducted by Charlie Hennekens at
Harvard.8 He told me the story behind his study. Dow Corning was
asked by the FDA to conduct some studies, and Dr. Hennekens thought
he had the perfect population. He had some data and thought he could
look back at his study population and ask some of the necessary questions.
He thought they could get these data in an unbiased way because the
women were part of a different study.
The women filled out
questionnaires but were not specifically asked whether they had breast
implants, if they felt tired, or if they had headaches. 9
Dr. Hennekens went to David Kessler, the head of the FDA, and told
him he had a problem. He explained that he wanted to do the study, but
if he did it and Dow Corning paid for it, there was no way to protect the
results from future claims of contamination. Dr. Hennekens asked what
he might do to maintain his scientific integrity and yet take the funding.
7. See MARCIA ANGELL, M.D., SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 57-60 (1996) (noting that
documents indicated "how little was known, how inadequate the studies had been, and
how relentlessly the company pursued its marketing goals").
8. See Charles H. Hennekens, M.D., et al., Self-Reported Breast Implants and
Connective Tissue Diseases in Female Health Professionals:A Retrospective Cohort

Study, 275 JAMA 616 (1996).
9. See id. at 617.
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They decided that the best thing to do was to get something in writing
from Dow Corning, which stated that it would fund the study but not
require disclosure about interim findings. Dr. Hennekens could also say
and publish what he wanted, and Dow Corning would not know what he
said until he decided to tell them. That is exactly what occurred.
However, when the study came out, people claimed that the results
could not be believed because the study was funded by Dow Corning.
The results did not show what the plaintiffs' attorneys had hoped they
would show. It was simply another one of those studies that did not show
much.
When I went to report on these stories-and this comes back to the
central question of whether independent scientific experts can be found-I
had the same problem that I had with the breast implant stories.
Everybody that cared about the data seemed to be associated with one side
or another-they were a consultant, an expert witness, or they were
something else. When you do a story, and you write, "Dr. So-and-So,
who is a consultant for Dow Corning, said he thinks there is nothing
there," or "Dr. So-and-So, who is an expert witness for the plaintiffs,"
people discount it immediately. How do you find independent people?
Although it is not simple, it is not, on the other hand, impossible.
When I was reporting on doctors who had deals with lawyers, and
who I thought were running women through mills and coming out with the
disease they wanted to find and the treatment they wanted to give, I found
something else instead. I found doctors who were specialists in those
diseases, who had nothing to do with breast implant litigation, and who
were more than willing to discuss the issue with me and give some very
strong statements. I did not have trouble finding very credible people with
very good scientific reputations who were not making any money on this.
At first, some people were hesitant to even get involved for fear of being
drawn into the litigation as an expert witness. But, many of these doctors
felt so strongly about what they were seeing that they decided that they
should talk about it anyway.
When I wanted to write about Charlie Hennekens's story, I thought
that I should use the same approach. I decided to find epidemiologists
who had experience evaluating large studies like this, had never had
anything to do with breast implant litigation, had never made any money
from it, and who had never consulted for anybody and did not want to,
and then ask if they would look at the results and tell me what they
thought. I found several people. It did not take a month-long search; it
took about a day or so. It was not impossible.
So from my own experience, I agree that it can be difficult to find lay
people who understand these complexities. I think that we are talking
about a method of reasoning that many people do not understand. They
are not used to thinking the way that scientists think and they are not used
to evaluating evidence. However, I do not think it is that difficult to find
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scientists. We have bodies like the National Research Council that can
help us find independent experts to objectively look at studies and evaluate
results. This might help to avoid repeating situations like the Bendectin
and breast implant litigation, in which we had competing experts.

WHOSE GORE IS STALKED?
PETER HUBER, SIXTH PANELIST*

With only one glaring exception, "junk science" is politically neutral.
It is the nature of science and junk science alike that they do not care who
they help or hurt. Whoever wrote the laws of science was indifferent to
human and social outcomes.
An earlier speaker mentioned my name in connection with tobacco
and referred to me, I believe, as an "expert" for one side in these cases.
This illustrates, I think, how casual some plaintiffs' lawyers are about who
they will designate as an "expert." I have written one Forbes column in
which I mentioned the economic impacts of tobacco' and appeared on
two television debates on the subject. This, I now learn, is enough to
qualify me as a "leading expert" on the matter.
Well, then, here is my expert opinion. There are three facts about
tobacco that richly illustrate how politically neutral facts can be. As a
non-smoker with no involvement at all in tobacco litigation, I take none
of them personally. I don't get indignant about them. I don't even much
care if anybody believes them or not. I take consolation in the knowledge
that they are objectively true.
The first is that tobacco companies sold cigarettes in Mississippi. The
second is that those sales caused a lot of premature death in Mississippi.
And the third is that those deaths saved the State of Mississippi money.
Call me the "Angel of Darkness" if you like. It won't change the facts.
Notice that two of those three facts are vigorously contested by
lawyers. Most tobacco companies would like to suggest that tobacco did
not, in fact, cause premature death. The plaintiffs' lawyers would like
to suggest that Mississippi saves a lot of money when its citizens live to
a ripe old age. Both sides deserve to lose. We are watching, here, a
spectacle in which two packs of liars go after each other. They are just
lying about different clusters of facts.
The tobacco packs aren't alone, of course. I watched with great
interest when Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phannaceuticals,Inc.2 went up to
the Supreme Court.
Both sides wanted experts and professional
associations to file amicus briefs on their sides. Steven J. Gould, a
renowned paleontologist who teaches at Harvard, allowed his name to be
* Senior Fellow of the Manhattan Institute for Policy Research and serves as Of
Counsel to the law firm of Kellogg, Huber, Hansen, Todd & Evans.

1. See Peter Huber, Health, Death and Economics, FoRBES, May 10, 1993, at 172.
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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attached to one of those briefs. 3
I don't know him personally, but
politics aside, I admire and like him. Many of you have read his columns
and books.4 Mr. Gould allowed his name to be associated with a brief
that supported the plaintiffs, and argued for a lenient definition of
"scientific knowledge" for legal purposes. Sharp lines, the brief argued,
could not be drawn between good science and junk in court.' A curious
position, I thought, for a man who, in his other life, has argued so long
and hard for maintaining a sharp line between evolution, on the one
hand, and "creation science" on the other.' Mr. Gould is clear enough
on the differences between science and junk in his own field, when such
lines coincide with his own political preferences. I wish he had been
equally clear when they did not.
But if Steven Gould was right in his Daubert brief, what could
possibly be wrong with the State of Mississippi legislating, for instance,
that its public schools teach only creation science, and not Darwin? If
there are no real lines, if one expert is as good as the next, if anybody we
hire is as believable as anybody else, how could it possibly be an
"establishment of religion" to have one brand of biological "science"
taught rather than another? If you believe the Daubert plaintiffs, you also
have to believe there is no difference between religion and science for
First Amendment purposes. After all, there are perfectly solemn and
properly dressed, properly credentialed people out there-they don't live
under bridges or anything like that-who call themselves "creation
scientists." They probably even have their own peer-reviewed journal.
Before Daubert, as you know, federal courts applied a standard first
articulated in a case called Frye v. United States.7 Frye, you will recall,
was a criminal case that involved lie-detector evidence.' But how many
of you remember whether it was the prosecutor or the defendant that
submitted the lie detector evidence that the Frye court excluded? I won't
tell you; if it matters to your views about Frye, then you will have to go
and look it up. 9 It doesn't matter to mine. I can tell you that only one
3. Brief Amici Curiae of Physicians, Scientists, and Historians of Science in Support
of Petitioners at 8-11, 14-19, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 579 (No. 92-102).
4. See, e.g., STEVEN JAY GOULD, DINOSAUR IN A HAYSTACK (1995); Steven Jay
Gould, Life on Mars? So What?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1996, at 13; Steven J. Gould,
No More 'Wretched Refuse,' N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 1995, at A27.
5. See Brief Amici Curiae at 8-11, 14-19, Daubert (No. 92-102).
6. See Schools Brief. The Missing Links of Evolution, ECONOMIST, May 23, 1987,

at 86.
7. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).

8. See id. at 1013.
9. See id. at 1014.
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side won. But what difference does that make to the accuracy, such as it
is, of a lie detector? Either lie detectors work reliably or they don't.
The same goes for DNA evidence. We saw, recently, the spectacle
of Barry Scheck advising one side in a much-publicized trial involving a
great deal of blood.'" Now, the science of DNA fingerprinting is what
it is, whoever's gore it stalks. It is equally reliable or unreliable, whether
submitted by somebody who has been on death row for ten years on a
rape-murder charge, and who can now prove that it was not his semen,
after all, or whether submitted to put another man on death row in his
place. The science is either good or it is bad; it is not just good when you
want it to be and bad when that better serves your private ends. Mr.
Scheck appears to be yet another prominent lawyer who hasn't fully
grasped that point.
Before Daubert, the Supreme Court took a case involving a certain
"Dr. Death"'-a psychiatrist who travels in southern courts testifying
"Future
about the "future dangerousness" of capital defendants.'
dangerousness" is a factor that is weighed in capital sentencing in many
states.' 3 Now, if psychiatric evidence of that kind is reliable, then it
should be admitted. And, if it is unmitigated junk-which, in fact, it
is-then Dr. Death should not be testifying in court. It is, indeed,
abominable that he is ever allowed in the door. Even if for the purpose
of sending Ted Bundy to the electric chair.14 Ted Bundy deserves to go.
But no self-respecting legal community deserves Dr. Death. This is just
a matter of proper sanitation in court.
Finally, it is rare that I agree with Mr. Nace, but I am happy to agree
with him on one small point today. He asked, if I understood him
correctly, how any parent of a daughter could wish on the world the kinds
of rules of evidence that I support. As it happens, I have three young
children, and I have their interests very much at heart. And I cannot
possibly believe that any father could wish his children to grow up in a
world in which junk science proliferates, and is accepted, not merely in
astrology columns that run next to the comics, but in courtrooms called
10. See At Simpson Trial, Blood Tests andBafflement, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1995,
at A14.
11. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); see also Peter Applebome, 'Blue
Line'Aftermath: New Trial Is Possible, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 8, 1988, at C19.

12. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 885.
13. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994); Johnson V. Texas,
509 U.S. 350 (1993); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896.
14. See Bundy v. State, 455 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1984).
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upon to decide the difference between truth and falsehood. 5 If I imagine
all my children as future plaintiffs with completely invalid claims, then of
course I might wish for them the kinds of rules that Mr. Nace espouses.
But perhaps they will some day be future plaintiffs with valid claims, and
face junk science from the other side. Or perhaps they will some day be
future defendants. Or future prosecutors. In my current state of
ignorance, the best I can hope for them is a truthful society, that knows
how to maintain good lines between science and the alternatives. The
only time you favor junk science is when the facts are against you.
If my child has cancer, and I am suing, I might well want junk
science. But if my child has cancer and I am trying to get her treated, I
want the Mayo Clinic. Yes indeed, if my child is represented some day
by Mr. Nace, I may want every possible edge in her favor. But then, she
might instead be one of Mr. Nace's targets, in which case I'd much prefer
rules that promote truth and accuracy.
Which brings me to my last point. If you believe that science exists,
and that true facts are ascertainable-that belief leads you to a certain view
of ordered society. Most people, most of the time, are best served by that
view. Only one particular community frequently is not. Only one
particular community consistently grows and prospers by rules that blur
all the lines between good science and bad. That's the legal community.
I do not mean just the plaintiffs' lawyers or the American Trial Lawyers
Association. I mean symmetrically, plaintiff and defense lawyers alike.
The more uncertainty there is, the more we can pretend that known facts
are not known; then the more we can hire legions of lawyers to stage
great circus-like battles between hired experts. Defense lawyers are
usually not quite so open about their own interests in this regard, because
their clients might protest. The fact is, lawyers on both sides of the aisle
are served by scientific anarchy.

15. See Barry J. Nace, Science and Civil Justice:A Recent Oxymoron, 41 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 393, 396 (1997).

ROUNDTABLE:
AUDIENCE DISCUSSION
EDWARD WARREN: It is the prerogative of the chair to ask one
question, and, in a sense, it is the question that I began with: If we accept,
as I do, that Judge Hand is right-that a rule that tries to say "this comes
in, this doesn't come in, this does, doesn't," based on some Frye or
Daubert standard is illogical and inconsistent with the view that the jury,
rather than the witnesses, ought to be addressing the ultimate issues and
ought to be addressing the grand and general premises-then it seems to
me the question, which I tried to pose initially, is nonetheless still a
question. That is, whether there is a way to get "good science" into a
decisional status in litigation.
Now, let me say that it may very well be that witnesses for the
plaintiffs and the defendants appear each to be carrying his or her own
biases, but this does not mean that all scientists are liars or that all
scientists are dishonest. That seems to be an example of the very
innumeracy that we are talking about.
My hypothesis would be that the scientific community, in general,
subscribes to what Peter Huber just said, and that is that science is
apolitical, that there really is scientific truth, yea or nay.' So the question
is whether that apolitical, truthful science is accessible in the judicial
process. I would also say, hypothetically, that if it is accessible to Gina
Kolata, it also ought to be accessible to federal judges or state judges if
they choose to attempt to find it. However, fundamentally, the question
seems to be: Will they attempt to find it? So the question-and this is the
kind of question that lawyers and judges of good faith must address-is
whether there is a mechanism that will permit them to find it in a fashion
that is appropriate and reviewable.
I would like at least the scientists here to tell me if they think that
Peter Huber is right, that there is something about the truth of science.
I would also like to know if Gina Kolata is right, that there is a
community-maybe it is ninety-eight percent of the scientific
community-that would like to wash its hands of the courtroom, but not
of science, and if asked to participate in a way that was consistent with
their own self-image and principles, would aid in this process. I would
like at least the three scientists and perhaps Barry Nace to just briefly
comment on whether they think that those premises have any validity.
DR. GEORGE EHRLICH: I think that there is some validity. I think
that we can, and should, get that kind of science; or, if we do not, I do
1. See Peter W. Huber, Whose Gore Is Stalked?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 419
(1997).
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not think that this committee-that outsiders-necessarily need to judge the
facts of the case. But they should judge the validity of the kind of
testimony and the validity of the kind of evidence that is being brought to
bear, and also the validity of the people who are going to provide this
testimony.
In the case we have been discussing-the silicone breast implant
case-I must take issue with what Dr. Anderson told you.2 Dr. Elizabeth
Connell, who was the Chairman of the Advisory Committee in the last
instance, has told me that there were serious distortions of what was
presented to the committee and the decision that came about. She said
that the outcome was not how the committee felt as a whole; and,
additionally, that there was nothing hidden from the committee, there were
no secret documents, and that the sarcomas that were found in the animals
are inherent in that particular species and have never been duplicated in
humans.3
I also know that there are more than 100,000 different kinds of
silicone and that the contents of the envelopes in the silicone breast
implants changed several times by the various manufacturers, so there was
no single compound.4
There was also the so-called "adjuvant
disease"-which was originally reported in Japan, by the way, not in the
United States-where reactions to injections of industrial, not medical,
silicone accompanied by paraffin, and some other substances, produced
horrible disease in some of the women,5 which have been incorrectly
extrapolated to breast implants. It reminds me of Tom Stoppard's play,
The Real Thing, where one of the characters says, "There's something
scary about stupidity made coherent." 6
I do not think that you can do that. There is absolutely no evidence
to suggest that the device or that the kinds of silicone used in the
device-not just in breast implants, but for other purposes in the body,
such as in joints, for leads, for pacemakers, or for various other purposes
that are absolutely essential, such as shunts-is in any way immunogenic
or causes any of the diseases. Furthermore, there are no longer any
2. See Norman Anderson, M.D., Lawsuit Science:Lessonsfrom the Silicone Breast
Implant Controversy, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 401 (1997).
3. See MARCIA ANGELL, M.D., SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL
EVIDENCE AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE

54-58 (1996).

4. See John R. Easter et al., Medical "State of the Art" for the Breast Implant
Litigation, in BREAST IMPLANT LITIGATION: CURRENT MEDICAL AND LEGAL THEORIES
18-21 (1993).
5. See id. at 29-32; Nachman Brautbar et al., Silicone Breast Implants and
Autoimmunity: Causation or Myth?, 49 ARCHIVES ENvTL. HEALTH 151 (1994).
6. TOM STOPPARD, THE REAL THING act 2, sc. 5 (rev. 1983).
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diseases being alleged. There is just a vague group of symptoms, none of
which can be verified, and suspect laboratory tests.
DR. NORMAN ANDERSON: Anybody who has worked in this arena
believes in science and believes that this is the only way we will achieve
effective, fair, and rational decisions. I believe in the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). I believe in regulation, and I think the FDA has
to have full access to all relevant material to make appropriate and fair
decisions.
The problem is that when that data is edited, suppressed, or delayed,
you can make, with the best intent, the wrong scientific decision. So one
has the ideal premise that has been put forward with Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmnaceuticals, Inc.,7 that in a real world we can identify good
science and go through in a very critical manner to resolve these
questions.8
I would like to remind you, again, not only that the Daubert panel
does not generate the data, but to question what kind of data is being
given to it. I have not said that, for example, the epidemiology failing to
link silicone with scleroderma is wrong. I only question what was not
looked at. What was ignored were reports that these devices rupture
anywhere between five and fifty percent of the time after they have been
in the body for ten years. 9
Another point that stands out, when looking at the history of peer
review for silicone breast implants, is that ninety percent of all the
literature up until 1991 came from plastic surgeons and representatives of
the silicone manufacturers. If you were going to use publication for
expertise, it would come from vested interests. You would see that
virtually none of the early publications about breast implants were in the
New England Journal of Medicine; they were in the specialty plastic
surgery journals.
7. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
8. See id. at 597.
9. See generally PAMELA SCOTr-KENDALL, TORN ILLUSIONS: ONE WOMAN'S
TRAGIC EXPERIENCE WITH THE SILICONE CONSPIRACY 113 (1994) (citing a Baylor
College of Medicine study that estimated that 70 percent of silicone implants rupture and
suggested that all implants will rupture with time and age); 0. Gordon Robinson, Jr,
M.D., et al., Analysis of Explanted Silicone Implants: A Report of 300 Patients, 34
ANNALS PLASTIC SURGERY 1 (1995) (noting that a study of 300 patients with implants
indicated a rupture rate of 71 percent); cf. ANGELL, supra note 3, at 21 (stating that the
best estimates of implant ruptures are around five percent); CouncilReport: Silicone Gel
Breast Implants, 270 JAMA 2602, 2604 (1993) (suggesting that four to six percent of

implants rupture); Joanne Jacobs, Hysteria Is Easier Than Science, and it Pays Better,
BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 7, 1996, at 19 (stating that implants rupture in as much as five
percent of women).
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In the days of silicone injections, the plastic surgeons denied that
silicone could destroy the breast. Editors added notes in press stating that
this destruction of the breast was not due to silicone, but was produced by
adulterants used in the sakurai formula.1 It took them twenty years to
admit that this was not true.
You can also look at the history of what I am worried about and what
my panel was worried about-rupture. A literature review of silicone
breast implants in 1988 reported forty cases of rupture, while, in 1991, a
single surgeon reported ninety-one cases." This simply meant that no
one published bad results. Records were not kept; but no one wanted to
publish bad results. When you have that situation, how do you find the
truth?
I also want to tell you that these decisions are not made in the
abstract. The plastic surgeon, who first raised the sword against silicone
injections in Las Vegas, had his practice destroyed, his referral base taken
away, and was disciplined for taking this stance. One of the members of
my FDA advisory committee who voted to say, "Keep these at class III,"
had his professional career threatened and never returned to an FDA
advisory panel. The second-in-command of the Canadian FDA was
critical of the polyurethane-coated breast implants and was fired. We can
even go on and talk about other kinds of discipline brought by professional
societies more recently in the implant dispute. In this highly charged
arena, with these kinds of pressures, it is one thing to talk about idealism,
but trench warfare can be very dirty.
DR. STUART SCHLOSSMAN: We have heard of a conspiratorial
approach. The fundamental issue, however, is that we really cannot go
back and look at what was to be done. Plainly, the breast manufacturers
did not do epidemiologic studies. But, now that they have supported
some, we are being told that it is bad that they have supported them. You
cannot have it both ways.
On the other hand, we must deal with individuals who represent
themselves as experts in the courts, who in reality are not experts. They
ask the courts to evaluate tests that are not well established, not
10. See Fernando Ortez-Monasterio, M.D., & Ignacio Trigos, M.D., Management
of Patientswith Complicationsfrom Injections of ForeignMaterialsinto the Breasts, 50

42, 42-47 (1972).
11. See Blaine Andersen, M.D., et al., The Diagnosisof RupturedBreastImplants,

PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY

84 PLASTIC RECONSTRUCTIVE SURGERY 903, 903-05 (1989); Norman D. Anderson,

M.D., & Wendie A. Berg, M.D., Impact of RecentAdvancesfor DetectingFailedBreast
Implants, in 1 MEDICAL & LEGAL ASPECTS OF BREAST IMPLANTS 3, 3-4 (1992); Charles
Vinnik, M.D., MigratorySilicone, in CLINICAL ASPECTS SILICONE INMEDICAL DEVICES

59-67 (Food & Drug Admin. Ctr. for Devices & Radiologic Health 1991).
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recognized by the FDA, and in many cases not recognized for the
purposes for which they are being used. Additionally, the tests are being
used to support the notion that silicone, or some toxic substance, produced
a terrible effect on the plaintiffs. How can these tests be evaluated when
many of them have been published in journals that are not available to the
rest of the immunologic community, and have not received true peer
review by scientists in that field? I think for that purpose you need some
form of an expert panel or group to review much of the scientific data that
is being presented to the courts.
As Gina Kolata indicated, the National Academy of Sciences, through
the Institute of Medicine and Medical Research Council can convene2
panels to investigate a number of important scientific issues.'
Additionally, there are reputable scientists who do not sell out to
companies when grants come into their universities from these companies.
Personally, I do not have a grant from Dow or from anyone else involved
in breast litigation.
There is institutional oversight in this area. For example, even if a
pharmaceutical company supported research-and keep in mind that
perhaps twenty percent of research in this country is supported by
pharmaceutical companies, while the vast majority is still supported by
National Institutes of Health and other agencies-the rules and regulations
that involve the pharmaceutical industry support are very stringent. As
was the case was with Dr. Hennekens and the School of Public Health, 3
the regulations prevent the Dow company from influencing the data prior
to its publication. 4 I think that this is the case in all the universities in
this country that I am aware of and that accept pharmaceutical industry
support, which is a valuable mechanism to support research in the

country.
BARRY NACE: Let me start off by saying Stephen J. Gould is
somebody that I do not know, have never met, have never talked to, and
have never had anything to do with. I did represent the plaintiffs in the
Daubert case, and I can assure you that Mr. Gould was not retained,
hired, or anything else, by any plaintiff in that case.
We hear a lot of rhetoric going around, but, you know, it still comes
down to the fact that I am not willing to accept everything you say. I am
not willing to accept everything that these people say, and, perhaps, my
clients are not willing to accept it either. I think we would feel much
more comfortable if we could get you under cross-examination and ask
12. See Gina Kolata, Science and Civil Justice, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 413, 417

(1997).
13. See id. at 415-16.
14. See ANGELL, supra note 3, at 95.
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questions, and then the people could decide what weight and what
credibility they want to give to you. I am not singling you out; that was
just an example. Since I have never met you before-and contrary to
everybody else in this room, I do not do breast implant cases-I do not
know what is going on there. It is very interesting, though, to listen to
it.
The bottom line is that I would disagree with these blue ribbon panels;
we do not need blue ribbon panels. What we need are attorneys who
properly know the subject and can cross-examine these people. If these
people are so bad, and I hear that these witnesses are so bad, I am
absolutely convinced that those good attorneys can cross-examine the hell
out of them and show how bad they are, to the point that their testimony
is either going to be stricken or totally disregarded.
It comes down to the fact that I would much rather rely on someone
who is a citizen of this country making decisions after they have heard all
of the evidence and testimony, rather than some blue ribbon elitist group
deciding what they want as evidence, or how they think the evidence will
be interpreted. I do not believe that cloaking individuals with science
degrees or black robes elevates them to a higher plane over neighbors and
fellow citizens when deciding on credibility and weight issues.
QUESTION: I want to ask a very specific question, which I think is
along the lines of what Mr. Warren has been trying to get at, and I will
ask Dr. Anderson because of his expressed faith in the FDA. If the FDA
finds a product to be safe and effective, which it has to do by statute, and
if the company has committed no fraud, would you support a rule and law
that precludes any court or jury from finding the product to be dangerous
and defective?
DR. ANDERSON: I would like to answer that in the affirmative, but
I cannot, because of the realities and practical experience. First, there are
the limitations in the data. The FDA does not conduct the science; it is
at the mercy of what it is given. Second, there is the problem of longterm follow-up and how accurate or good it is. Ultimately, the testing is
in the marketplace and in the outcome. The FDA is not infallible.
Another argument in favor of product liability is the fact that the
regulatory agency is subject to a great deal of political pressure. I have
watched Congress and the Executive Branch influence the direction of
FDA investigation. So the fact is that the regulatory agency is not run on
hard science. It is politically sensitive, and I think we have a reason for
not making it infallible in view of the law.
MR. NACE: In the very first Bendectin case that I tried-and
everybody in this area would agree with me, there was an extremely
conservative trial judge handling the case-the defense counsel got up and
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said, "Hey, the drug has been approved. It's on the market. The FDA
said it's okay." This extremely conservative judge looked at them,
pointed to the jury box and said, "There's your FDA." Based upon what
I have learned about the FDA and scientists over the years, I would much
rather rely on the jury to decide than the FDA.
QUESTION: Mr. Warren, regarding the proposal to set up panels to
evaluate expert testimony, there is a consequence that I do not know if
you have addressed. I was looking through the old records of one of my
former law firms, and I noticed the courts used to give trials within sixty
to ninety days after the complaint was served; however, that was in the
1890s. But, we had a couple of experiments in New York, one of which
called for medical malpractice panels. Another experiment was called
something like "mandatory conciliation." What is wrong in the civil
justice system today is complexity, not excessive simplicity. What are the
unintended effects of turning two lawyers loose on this additional panel
before you even impanel your jury. Additionally, think of the effects of
allowing the insurance companies to hold the money a few more months
while they attempt to abuse this additional step before they get to the real

thing.
MR. WARREN: Let me say, as Learned Hand said, that these are
issues that will be worked out in different ways, at different times, and at
different places.' 5 But, the principle that I believe he was advocating,
nonetheless, has much to recommend it.
If we allow expert witnesses to testify to opinion, because those are
general premises that are outside the kin of normal jurors, then it follows
logically that jurors who do not have specialized expertise cannot decide
between two experts who say competing things. So I believe this leads
logically to the conclusion that those issues, in the first instance, need to
be resolved by someone who can make those kinds of judgments, and that
general knowledge needs to be conveyed to the jury in a form in which it
can be used at trial.
Now, I would anticipate that if, in fact, my hypothesis, that there are
at least some unbiased scientists, were true, I suspect that those
individuals-most of whom do not have, and do not want, anything to do
with the courtroom, but perhaps could be persuaded to play a role if their
principles and discipline were accepted-would find that much of the
cross-examination by both sides in these cases was hogwash and a waste
of time. I suspect what they would want to do, as Dr. Schlossman
15. See Learned Hand, Historicaland PracticalConsiderationsRegarding Expert
Testimony, 15 HARv. L. REv. 40, 56 (1902).
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suggested, is to say, "Let me see your underlying data, or let me address
how you got to the conclusions that you propose to testify to in this case."
I do not say these things are easy; I think the system is exceedingly
complex. I do think, however, that there is an important role for lawyers,
even under a system like that. But, I suspect it is quite a bit different
from the role that the lawyers are playing today.
You must pose questions that are of concrete value in a case. You
simply cannot let this be an open-ended process. Lawyers are good at
this. Judges are good at this. What I am suggesting is analogous to the
process that is employed when lawyers suggest alternative charges to a
jury on questions of law. There are certainly differences in point of view,
but it seems to me that the disputed issues of law for the judge to decide
become very clear. Those issues need to be posed to persons of expertise
who have the ability to address them in a manner that will provide general
and useable advice to the jury.
Again, let me just say that I do not want to be a great advocate for
this; I think there are immense complexities to overcome, and you have
to take things one step at a time. I only suggest that, logically, it has
advantages over the present system. As Judge Hand said, and I do believe
as Ms. Kolata said, we have scientific organizations of real merit in this
country, such as the National Research Council, the Council of the
National Academy of Sciences, and many professional organizations and
boards. I may think they are dilatory in their role in this process, but I
think persons of good faith, and judges of good intention, could approach
them, and I believe they would be able to persuade those organizations to
participate in experiments along the lines that we are talking about. So no
speeches ordered, but it seems to me, logically, that there is much to be
said for that point of view.

